Security / Built into the conversation

Your conversations.
Encrypted at the source.

Lock uses end-to-end encryption for message bodies and new file uploads. Your client encrypts the content before sending it, and recipient clients decrypt it with their keys. That includes file contents and filenames—not just the words you type.

01 / Before sending

Encrypted on your device.

02 / In transit & storage

Message and file ciphertext.

03 / When reading

Decrypted by your client.

Encryption goes beyond the message.

Each message uses a fresh encryption key, protected for the conversation’s keyed recipients. Each new file has its own random key. File contents, filename, file type and original size are encrypted before upload. Downloads require authenticated access, and the client decrypts the file locally.

The cryptography behind it

Messages and files use AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption. File keys are wrapped with the message key; message keys are wrapped for recipients. GCM authentication rejects modified ciphertext. WebCrypto and Apple CryptoKit use the same published attachment format.

This describes new encrypted uploads. Older web attachments previously uploaded to public storage are not retroactively encrypted.

Content privacy and workspace information.

Content encryption protects message bodies and new files. Account information, team membership, sender and conversation identifiers, timestamps, network requests and ciphertext sizes remain visible to the service so it can route messages and operate your workspace. The service also stores public keys and encrypted private-key backups.

Device security matters too: an unlocked or compromised device can expose the messages and keys available on it. Use your device’s screen lock and keep its software up to date.

Bring your keys with you.

Encrypted private-key backups support recovery on another device. A previously configured recovery key or an existing unlocked device can also help restore the original key. A password reset restores account access, but cannot recreate a lost encryption key. Keep your recovery method safe: losing every usable key and recovery method can make history permanently unreadable.

Password-based recovery trusts the sign-in service. It uses the same password submitted for authentication, so a compromised authentication server could capture that password and unlock the stored backup. This recovery flow is not zero-knowledge authentication.

How the backup is protected

Private-key backups use AES-256-GCM with a key derived by PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 using 600,000 iterations. Read the recovery FAQ for the distinction between account access, encryption recovery keys and two-factor recovery codes.

How recipient keys are managed.

Lock delivers recipient public keys through the service, so key distribution is part of the trust model. Browser users also trust the application code delivered by the service.

Recovery support and forward secrecy are different properties. Because messages include RSA recovery capsules, we do not claim strict forward secrecy against later theft of a recipient’s RSA private key.

Message key agreement details

Web messages may use P-256 one-time prekeys with HKDF-SHA256, alongside RSA-OAEP-SHA256 recovery capsules. The recovery capsules preserve a recovery path and are why strict forward secrecy is not claimed.

Voice calls have their own security model.

Calls are end-to-end encrypted and authenticated with the same chat identity keys you use for messages. Fresh audio and signing keys are created for each call; your long-term chat keys authenticate the connection rather than directly encrypting the audio. Key-possession checks run automatically, without code comparison. First-use keys are trusted through authenticated server signalling and remembered locally only after mutual possession proofs succeed. Changed remembered keys block calls and are not silently replaced. Without comparison, first-use trust depends on the service: a compromised signalling service could substitute an identity on first contact.

Identity pins detect key substitution, not a stolen private key. Call authentication now inherits the chat identity’s password-backed recovery limitation: a compromised authentication server could capture the account password and unlock that identity backup. Pins do not add identity verification to chat messages. The signaling service and TURN relay do not receive media keys through the call protocol, but still see connection metadata. Compromised devices or malicious web-delivered code can defeat client-side protections.

Evidence you can check

These checks demonstrate format compatibility and authenticated-encryption behavior.

Implementation notes / Updated October 3, 2026